France to stop certifying non-quantum-safe security products

France’s national cybersecurity agency, ANSSI, will stop certifying security products that do not use quantum-resistant encryption from 2027. The agency also urged businesses to purchase only quantum-safe products by 2030. The change affects suppliers seeking contracts with the French government and operators of critical infrastructure.

ANSSI’s chief of staff, Samih Souissi, announced the timeline at the France Quantum 2026 Summit. He said vendors must demonstrate post-quantum cryptography capability to obtain certification after 2027. ANSSI certification is required for use across French government agencies and by critical infrastructure operators, so products that do not meet the requirement risk exclusion from public tenders and essential systems.

Souissi described the policy as involving governance, industrial planning, regulation and national sovereignty. Marin Ivezic, founder of consulting firm Applied Quantum, wrote on LinkedIn that two of the world’s most demanding cryptographic certification authorities have converged on the same year to make post-quantum cryptography a pass-fail requirement.

The French timeline aligns with recent guidance from the United States intelligence and security community. The U.S. framework requires new national security system acquisitions to support an approved suite of quantum-resistant algorithms by Jan. 1, 2027, with noncompliant systems to be phased out by the end of 2030 and all systems to use the approved algorithms by the end of 2031.

For vendors, the requirement means updating cryptographic implementations, testing products for post-quantum algorithms and completing revised certification processes. For public and private buyers, ANSSI’s recommendation sets a procurement expectation: purchases after 2030 should be quantum-safe in order to meet the agency’s guidance.

The policy responds to concerns that sufficiently powerful quantum computers could break widely used public-key systems such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. Security specialists warn that encrypted data captured now could be stored and decrypted later if quantum computers reach required capability, creating long-term confidentiality risks.

Analysts estimate that nearly 10% of Bitcoin’s total supply, about 1.92 million BTC, could be considered vulnerable if a practical quantum computer capable of breaking current signature schemes were built. Some cryptocurrency firms have warned that proof-of-stake blockchains may face greater near-term risk because of the signature algorithms validators use.

Several blockchain projects have started work to harden networks against quantum threats. Algorand has published a staged roadmap toward quantum readiness, Aptos has said it is positioned for a transition to post-quantum secure transactions, and Ethereum and Solana have plans to upgrade signature schemes and other cryptographic primitives to algorithms designed to resist quantum attacks.

Implementing post-quantum cryptography will require coordination among vendors, certification laboratories and purchasers. Tasks include standardizing approved algorithms, testing products for interoperability, and ensuring updates do not introduce functional or security regressions. ANSSI’s timeline gives suppliers and users clear dates for meeting government certification requirements and sets quantum resistance as a baseline expectation for systems used in government and critical infrastructure.