Poland says Russia funds European sabotage network with crypto
Polish security officials say Russia is financing a sabotage network across Europe via cryptocurrency transfers, the Financial Times reports.
According to Poland’s National Security Bureau (BBN) in Warsaw, crypto payments enable Russian handlers to hire a diverse set of operatives, from lone actors to small cells, to launch drones, commit arson, hit warehouses and logistics hubs, and carry out cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. The pseudo‑anonymity of wallets and services with weak or absent KYC lowers the barrier to entry and makes the money trail from organizers to contractors harder to follow.
In parallel, Polish officials allege that Moscow is using cryptocurrency to service and refit vessels in its so‑called “shadow fleet”. These tankers are used not only to skirt sanctions, but reportedly as platforms for launching reconnaissance drones into European airspace. The pattern fits a broader playbook of hybrid warfare, blending espionage, influence operations and pinpoint acts of sabotage intended to sow unease and stretch the security services of Ukraine’s allies.
Recent cases across Europe illustrate the trend. In the United Kingdom, a court is hearing a case over an alleged arson attack on a humanitarian‑aid warehouse. Suspects were reportedly recruited via closed Telegram channels and promised payment in crypto. In Germany, prosecutors open proceedings against a group accused of planning sabotage at strategic facilities. In Poland, courts issue sentences for industrial arson and subversive activity said to be financed in stablecoins.
The EU’s response is becoming more systemic. Law‑enforcement agencies in several member states are identifying and shuttering no‑KYC “exchangers” and instant‑swap platforms that help launder tranches for cybercrime and sabotage. Brussels is weighing tighter restrictions on Russian‑linked crypto services, while Warsaw is increasing its cybersecurity budget and pushing for real‑time intelligence sharing among European services.
Polish investigators argue the centre of gravity has shifted from sporadic influence operations to a longer‑running, decentralized campaign of pressure. Crypto wallets, anonymous messengers and gig‑style recruitment let Moscow test dozens of small‑scale scenarios at low cost.
For Europe, the risk is less a single “big hit” than the slow erosion of resilience from water supply and logistics to public trust.
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